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Youth employment decline and the structural change
of skill
Michael Tåhlin and Johan Westerman
Swedish Institute for Social Research (SOFI), Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden
ABSTRACT
Labor market prospects for youth have deteriorated significantly in many OECD
countries over recent decades. While the extent and consequences of falling
youth employment are commonly studied, attempts at understanding its
causes have been much more limited. The present paper attempts to fill this
explanatory gap. We suggest that the secular decline in youth employment
can be accounted for by the structural change of skill. This process of
structural change has two interrelated components: (a) one part where skill
supply (individual educational attainment) and skill demand (educational
requirements of jobs) grow together in what can be called matched
upgrading and (b) another part where excess skill supply leads to mismatch
and crowding-out. These components of skill growth have commonly been
treated separately and incompletely in the literature. We build on both of
them in developing our account of why the labor market for youth has
weakened. Using data on 10 European countries from the EU Labor Force
Surveys over the period 1998 to 2015, we estimate associations between the
structural change of skill and youth employment decline. The main conclusion
is that both matched skill upgrading and overeducation are strongly and
negatively linked to young people’s employment chances.
ARTICLE HISTORY Received 4 December 2017; Accepted 1 November 2018
KEYWORDS Youth employment; skill upgrading; overeducation
Introduction
Over recent decades, it has become increasingly hard for young people to
gain a foothold on the labor market (e.g. Blanchflower and Freeman 2000;
Blossfeld et al. 2008; Christopoulou 2013). The extent and consequences
of this secular weakening of youth employment prospects have commonly
© 2018 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDer-
ivatives License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distri-
bution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered,
transformed, or built upon in any way.
CONTACT Michael Tåhlin michael.tahlin@sofi.su.se Swedish Institute for Social Research (SOFI),
Stockholm University, SE-106 91 Stockholm, Sweden
Supplemental data for this article can be accessed here https://doi.org/10.1080/14616696.2018.
1552981
EUROPEAN SOCIETIES
2020, VOL. 22, NO. 1, 47–76
https://doi.org/10.1080/14616696.2018.1552981
been studied, yet, attempts at understanding its causes have been much
more limited (Banerji et al. 2015). Previous research on the labor
market for youth has tended to focus on institutional factors explaining
cross-sectional differences between countries (see e.g. Breen 2005).
Although this research has provided many valuable contributions, our
purpose in this paper is different: we aim at accounting for change in
the youth labor market, and more specifically for youth employment
decline in recent decades.
We suggest that the secular decline in youth employment to a signifi-
cant extent can be accounted for by the structural change of skill. The
essence of our story is that a falling share of available low-skill jobs
explains declining youth employment, because jobs with low skill require-
ments are important for young individuals who need them to enter the
labor market. The availability of low-skill jobs has been reduced over
time as a consequence of two interrelated structural shifts: (a) one part
where skill supply (individual educational attainment) and skill demand
(educational requirements of jobs) grow together in what can be called
matched upgrading and (b) another part where excess skill supply leads
to mismatch and overeducation. We decompose structural skill change
into matched and mismatch components by applying a micro-level
measurement model designed by Duncan and Hoffman (1981) to
macro-level data. On the basis of labor force survey data (EU-LFS) from
ten northwestern European countries for the period 1998–2015, we then
examine the empirical links between the structural change of skill and
youth employment decline and find support for our proposed account.
Although the decline of youth employment has been described in pre-
vious research, we begin our analysis by providing a recapitulation of the
change that has taken place. The evolution of youth employment in the
ten examined countries is displayed in Figure 1(a,b) (for men and
women, respectively). We define youth as age 25–29 (to allow for edu-
cation to be completed) and compare young men and women with
mid-age (40–49) men (to control for changes in general labor demand).
The figures show how the youth-adult employment gaps thus defined
have evolved from the earliest timepoints covered by OECD’s labor
force statistics through 2015 (see OECD 2017) in each of the countries
considered.
The overall picture for men (Figure 1(a)) is a widening employment gap
between young and mid-age individuals, but there is also significant cross-
national variation in this regard. Eight of the ten countries display an
upward trend in the gap from 2000 and onwards. For women (Figure 1
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(b)), the trend is much less visible than for men since the gender gap in
employment is still closing in several countries, thus compensating for
widening gaps between young women and mid-age men. Still, we expect
that young women face similar opportunities and constraints as do
young men with regard to changes in the structure of skill supply and
demand, to be revealed in the more analytic empirical models estimated
below.
The paper is organized as follows. We begin by formulating our
suggested causal account of how aggregate skill change affects labor
market prospects for youth. We then briefly review previous explanations
of youth employment variation. The methods section describes data,
measures and analytic strategy. We then turn to estimating associations
between structural skill change and the evolution of youth employment,
separately for women and men. A discussion section concludes.
Figure 1a. Male youth employment gap (vs. mid-age males) (%).
EUROPEAN SOCIETIES 49
Youth employment decline and the structural change of skill:
story outline and hypotheses
The skill structure of labor markets has a supply side and a demand
side, where supply consists of individuals’ human capital (education
and experience) and demand consists of jobs’ human capital require-
ments. Experience, aside from education, is a key determinant of pro-
ductive capacity (Mincer 1974). Indeed, historically, on-the-job
learning rather than formal schooling has been the main source of
skill formation (see e.g. Mincer 1958). Requirements of education and
experience are positively correlated: jobs requiring relatively large
amounts of education, as revealed by entry requirements, tend to
require relatively large amounts of experience, as revealed by both
entry requirements and experience-wage gradients (see e.g. Goldthorpe
and McKnight 2004; Tåhlin 2007). Since young people are relatively
Figure 1b. Female youth employment gap (vs. mid-age males) (%).
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inexperienced, they are (given education) hence less competitive in high-
skill jobs than in low-skill jobs.
While availability of low-skill jobs is thus especially important for
youth, the young can nonetheless be at a disadvantage also in the compe-
tition for low-skill jobs. Experience is not only constituted of advanced
skills such as technical mastery of specialized tasks, typically required
and developed in complex (high-skill) jobs. Experience may also be con-
stituted by more basic skills, such as regularly showing up on time in good
shape for performing everyday work tasks and then diligently taking care
of them. Basic skills are non-cognitive in character, and are required and
developed in all jobs, regardless of complexity.
Basic skills are more reliably indicated by experience than by (post-
compulsory) education. Completing additional education of course indi-
cates the possession of some basic skills, yet, documented work experience
is typically the best signal of an individual’s ability to accurately perform
work also in a new job (see e.g. Holzer 1996). Since basic skills are tied to
experience, the young are less competitive than mid-age workers not only
– and especially – in high-skill jobs but also – although by a slimmer
margin – in low-skill jobs.
The arguments above can be summarized in two fundamental assump-
tions: (a) experience is more highly valued (by employers) in high-skill
than in low-skill jobs; (b) experience is more highly valued (by employers)
than (post-compulsory) education in low-skill jobs. In order to test these
two assumptions, demand-side data about what employers want are
crucial. The Swedish Establishment Survey (APU) 2000 contains infor-
mation collected on the demand side. Employers/managers at a nationally
representative sample of workplaces were asked about their hiring criteria
for jobs at different skill levels. Specifically, they were asked to grade how
important education (other than basic) and work experience (organization
internal or external) were for their hiring decisions of, respectively, higher
white-collar and blue-collar workers, on a scale ranging from 0 (not at all
important), 1 (somewhat important), to 2 (very important). We used data
from this survey for organizations employing both types of workers (N =
864), and computed within-organization differences in hiring criteria for
higher white-collar and blue-collar workers. Results provided strong
support for both assumptions.1
The assumptions and their implications for youth skill deficits in low-
skill and high-skill jobs are visualized in Figure 2. It is evident from the
figure that the skill gap (comparative disadvantage) for youth is largest
in high-skill jobs. In these jobs, young people are at a disadvantage both
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in terms of advanced and basic skills. In low-skill jobs the gap is smaller
and is mainly constituted by a lack of (documented) basic skills, making
these jobs easier to attain and hold for the young; thus the paramount
importance of their availability. Given assumption (b), however, even
youths with superior post-compulsory education are at a disadvantage
relative to more experienced workers in the competition for low-skill
jobs; thus the importance of minimizing this competition.
After this brief outline of the micro-foundations of our argument, we
now turn to the structural (macro-level) factors that have changed the
conditions of the competition visualized in Figure 2.
Skill upgrading
The skill structure of jobs tends to be upgraded over time due to technologi-
cal progress in a wide sense; this development is often referred to as skill-
biased technical change (see e.g. Acemoglu 2002). Rising skill demand in
Figure 2. Skill deflicits of high/low skilled youth vs. high/low skilled mid-aged within
high/low–skill jobs.
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the labormarket has been an integral part of technological development for
at least the past half-century (see e.g. Katz andMargo 2014). Human capital
theory (Becker 1964) was formulated on the basis of modeling the positive
impact of skills on productivity, raising economic growth at the aggregate
(macro) level and earnings at the individual (micro) level; see Mincer
(1984) for an overview of such micro–macro links.
A link between long-run skill upgrading and declining youth employ-
ment has previously been suggested by Ryan (2001). While acknowledging
that the rise in demand for educated workers should by itself be helpful to
youth, since the young tend to be relatively well (or at least more) edu-
cated, Ryan argued that the parallel rise in demand for experienced
workers would counteract and potentially exceed the education effect, to
the disadvantage of the young. He thus formulated the ‘double skill-
bias’ hypothesis: technological change in recent decades has tended to
diminish the chances of labor market success not only for the less edu-
cated but also for the less experienced, i.e. youth.
Ryan’s (2001) account was updated and extended by Christopoulou and
Ryan (2009) andChristopoulou (2013). In these studies, technical change is
measured indirectly with national yearly expenditures on research and
development and ICT (Information and Communications Technologies)
capital services. They find mixed empirical evidence concerning the nega-
tive impact of rising skill demand thus indicated on youth employment
prospects but struggle to separate their demand measure from a simple
global trend. Few studies have examined the impact of skill upgrading on
youth employment prospects using more direct measures of skill
demand. A rare example is Gangl (2002) who examines labor market
attainment among recent school-leavers in 12 European countries 1988–
1997; he finds, i.a., that upgrading of the occupational structure increases
unemployment for the low-educated young but not for other youth.
In sum, there are good theoretical reasons to expect an association
between skill upgrading and waning youth employment prospects via
rising experience requirements, but empirical analyses of this issue have
so far been very limited.
Crowding out
A second important structural change affecting the competition visualized
in Figure 2 is educational expansion; this has been a pervasive feature of
economic and social development for many decades, not only as a
response to rising skill demand in the labor market but also for other
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reasons. Long-run skill upgrading need therefore not imply a chronic
shortage of highly educated individuals to fill the newly created high-
skill jobs. The converse shortage – of high-skill jobs relative to skill
supply – can appear either through a general fall in labor demand, typi-
cally in economic downturns, or in periods when educational expansion
exceeds the growth of high-skill jobs. In recent decades, such excess
skill supply (overeducation) has been more common than skill deficits
in many Western countries, with crowding-out of the low-educated as a
consequence (see e.g. Teulings and Koopmanschap 1989; van Ours and
Ridder 1995; Åberg 2003; Gesthuizen and Wolbers 2010; Abrassart 2015).
For crowding-out to occur, jobs with relatively fixed requirements are a
necessary feature, as in the job competition model of Thurow (1975). In
this model employers rank job candidates by their apparent suitability
(or trainability) for successful task completion and then hire workers in
that order. Education is typically seen as a general indicator of productive
capacity and hence determines each individual’s place in the line of job
applicants. We argue, however, that crowding-out related to skill-based
job competition is consequential not only for different educational cat-
egories but also for different age groups, i.e. employers rank applicants
also in terms of experience as an indicator of productive capacity. We
are not aware of any previous comparative studies of crowding-out
effects in the labor market that have thoroughly considered this possibility.
Hypotheses
Consider again employers’ hiring and lay-off decisions as visualized in
Figure 2 above. The structural change of skill affects the employment pro-
spects of youth via two routes: (1) Skill upgrading hurts youth by reducing
the proportion jobs that are especially important for the young, i.e. jobs
with low skill requirements; this is a compositional shift from low-skill
to high-skill jobs, running from left to right along the horizontal axis in
the figure. (2) Skill mismatch exacerbates the decline in opportunities
for youth by intensifying skill-based competition in low-skill jobs; this is
a shift within the category of low-skill jobs, running upward along the ver-
tical axis in the figure.2 These two routes are the basis for two hypotheses
to be empirically tested in the present paper:
(1) Matched skill upgrading is associated with a fall in youth employment
(2) Rising skill mismatch (esp. overeducation) is associated with a fall in
youth employment
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As far as we know, these hypotheses have not previously been analyzed
– theoretically or empirically – in a joint framework. As discussed above,
empirical testing of the two hypotheses one by one has also been very
limited in earlier research.
Alternative explanations of youth employment variation
Two institutional factors, tied to cross-national – as distinct from temporal –
variation in youth employment patterns, have figured prominently in socio-
logical research on youth employment: school-to-work linkages and employ-
ment protection legislation (EPL) (see e.g. Breen 2005). In a temporal
perspective, school-to-work linkages have been quite stable; in contrast, sig-
nificant shifts in EPL have occurred and could potentially have affected
trends in youth employment. Due to a widespread belief that strict EPL
raises hurdles for labor market entrants (such as youth), many countries in
recent years have tended to becomemore permissive regarding the use of tem-
porary contracts. Thus far, however, shifts in employment protection rules do
not seem to have affected youth unemployment (Gebel and Giesecke 2016).
Other political interventions that potentially could improve youth
employment prospects include lowered minimum wages, supposedly
helping youth by making it cheaper for employers to hire inexperienced
workers. Neumark and Wascher (2014) show that increased hiring of
young workers induced by wage reductions has primarily taken place in
countries with relatively weak employment protection, such as the
United States. Active labor market programs (ALMP) in various forms
have also been implemented in some countries in order to improve skill
matching between job-seekers and employers. The bulk of research on
this topic consists of specific program evaluations and points to a positive,
albeit limited and mixed, impact of ALMP on youth employment (see
Kluve et al. 2017). The aggregate impact of national ALMP expenditures
on overall youth employment is, however, a less studied topic.
Three common stories in the economic literature on youth employ-
ment are economic stagnation, job polarization, and immigration.
According to the first story, a (supposed) long-term decrease in general
labor demand might especially have disfavored marginal groups such as
youth (e.g. Blanchflower and Freeman 2000). Second, a (supposed)
long-run fall in the mid-skill job share of all employment relative to
high-skill and low-skill jobs (‘job polarization’; Goos and Manning
2007; Autor 2010) might have compelled mid-age, mid-educated
workers to downgrade in the job structure, thereby increasingly
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competing with youth for low-skill jobs (e.g. Smith 2011). Third, growing
immigration into many western countries in recent decades might have
affected youth employment negatively via intensified job competition at
labor market entry points (e.g. Smith 2012). The polarization and immi-
gration scenarios are also important elements in sociological research on
the growing labor market problems for young workers during the present
era of globalization (see e.g. Blossfeld et al. 2008; de Lange et al. 2014).
In our empirical analyses, we will account for these alternative expla-
nations as far as possible within the scope of our analytic focus. We will
thus examine the impact of institutional and contextual change in
various forms: labor market policy shifts, economic stagnation, job polar-
ization and rising immigration. At least the latter two are also partly reflec-
tive of globalization. In contrast, stable institutional factors (such as school-
to-work-linkages) while important to control since they account for cross-
sectional differences between countries, would appear to be unlikely contri-
butors to explanations of changing youth employment prospects.
Methods
Data
The European Labour Force Surveys (EU-LFS) are a collection of nation-
ally representative surveys with standardized indicators of, inter alia,
employment, education and occupation; see Eurostat (2016). Data
extend back to 1983 for some countries, but missing occupational infor-
mation makes it difficult to achieve a sufficient country sample before
1998. The covered time period should be viewed as a recent-time
excerpt from the long-term development described in the introduction.
Ten countries in northwestern Europe are selected: Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Slovenia,
Sweden, and the United Kingdom. The analytical sample includes 177
country-year units of observation from 1998 to 2015 (Germany, Ireland
and the UK lack data for 1998). The number of respondents varies
from around 15,000 (Denmark 2004) to 484,000 (Germany 2015) with
a median of 92,000 and a mean of 120,000. Altogether, the selected data
include information on 21 million respondents.
Analytic strategy
The EU-LFS data have a three-level hierarchical structure: individuals
nested in countries and years, thus forming a set of time-series cross-
56 M. TÅHLIN AND J. WESTERMAN
sectional (TSCS) data. The associations between the youth-adult
employment gap and the structural parameters are the effects of interest.
One way to capture this kind of effect is to estimate a two-step multi-
level regression i.e. to treat individual level coefficients predicting a
difference between two groups as dependent variable in a regression
at the country-year level (Bryan and Jenkins 2015; a recent example
using this method is Gebel and Giesecke 2016). We have a similar yet
slightly different approach. Instead of running regressions, two pro-
portions are computed: one employment rate for each group (youth
and mid-aged). Then, at the country-year level (N = 177; see above),
the mid-age employment rate is included as a covariate in a regression
of youth employment. The coefficients of matched skill upgrading and
skill mismatch in this regression model capture directly the interaction
effects between skill structure and young age, while the coefficient of the
mid-age employment rate (supposedly) captures the impact of general
labor demand.
We estimate all models separately by sex. Given our theoretical model,
it is also of interest to separate the experience gap from the total skill gap
(including both education and experience). This is done by weighting
young and mid-aged individuals with respect to their distribution over
educational levels (primary, secondary, tertiary) such that the weighted
distribution of education is equal across the two age groups. This pro-
cedure is similar to holding education constant in a regression at the indi-
vidual level. The main benefit of our approach compared to a two-step
regression is that we do not need to choose an education category as refer-
ence, i.e. the controlled estimates used as outcome in the regression
models apply to all individuals in each age group.
We account for stable country-level confounders (such as educational
systems related to varying school-to-work linkages) by including
dummy (indicator) variables for countries and years, i.e. a fixed effects
(FE) approach. A model including FE allows us to come closer to a
causal interpretation of our estimates (compared to a cross-sectional
model), since it controls not only stable confounders but also global
trends and shocks (such as the financial crisis in 2008). The inclusion of
yearly fixed effects also controls for the break in the time-series of the
skill structure indicators in 2011 (due to a shift from ISCO-88 to
ISCO-08).
The FE approach still assumes that unobserved interaction effects
between the institutional set-up and unobserved time-varying co-
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variates are unrelated to the focal associations, which makes it crucial to
select approximately similar countries in terms of institutions and
general macro-economic conditions. Therefore, countries in eastern
and southern Europe are excluded, the former being recent democracies
and late economic developers, the latter having institutional structures
that imply special circumstances concerning youth labor market partici-
pation. One country at the northwestern border of eastern Europe is
included in our analysis, Slovenia, whose institutions and macro-econ-
omic conditions resemble western more than eastern Europe (Saar et al.
2008). Additionally, five countries in northwestern Europe are excluded
from our comparison: Iceland and Luxembourg (due to their small
populations), France (due to its hybrid institutional structure with sig-
nificant southern European features; see e.g. Chevalier 2016), and
Norway and Switzerland (due to their exceptional economic traits
leading to very high levels of general labor demand).
As discussed above, we also assess several alternative explanations of
changing youth employment by controlling for a set of time-varying vari-
ables. These include GDP per capita (US$ PPPs) and average hours
worked per person in the working age population (as indicators of
general labor demand), ALMP (expenditures as share of GDP divided
by the labor force size adjusted number of program participants), employ-
ment protection legislation (regular and temporary) and the immigrant
share of employment (as computed from the EULFS-data). All control
variables were downloaded from the OECD statistics web page (except
as otherwise stated).
A common statistical problem when estimating regression models
with TSCS data is serial correlation, violating the assumption of inde-
pendent observations. As a solution, the regression equation can be
transformed by taking serial correlation of the first order (one time-
point back) into account while still keeping the first observation;
this is known as the Prais-Winsten transformation (see e.g. Wool-
dridge 2008). Other common problems are error disturbances, and
heteroscedasticity in the regression residuals due to variation in the
preciseness of the estimates across county-year samples. Beck and
Katz (1995) recommend using panel-corrected standard errors as a
solution to these problems. Thus, in estimating the regression
models below, we consistently apply Prais-Winsten transformations
(with a country-specific autocorrelation structure) and use panel-cor-
rected standard errors.
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Outcome variables: measuring labor market participation
Our measure of labor market participation is the employment rate, i.e.
the employed share of the population in a given age group. Two
alternative measures are the unemployment rate and the NEET
(‘Not in Education, Employment or Training’) rate. The unemploy-
ment rate is problematic since it is (usually) expressed as a proportion
of the labor force; both non-employed students and non-employed not
actively looking for a job are thus excluded. The NEET measure is also
less than ideal for our purposes, since it equates education and
employment as activities without taking into account that schooling
may be a second-best option in the face of weak employment
chances. We therefore see the employment rate as the best activity
measure among youth. To minimize the problem of how to classify
students, we define youth as age 25–29, thus setting the lower age
limit above the modal point of schooling completion, including tertiary
education.
Explanatory variables: measuring change in the skill structure via the
ORU model
As outlined above, the skill structure of labor markets has a supply side
and a demand side. Supply consists of individuals’ human capital, typi-
cally indicated by education and experience, while demand consists of
jobs’ human capital requirements. Skill demand can thus be measured
by requirements of education and experience at the job level. Data on
experience requirements are not available in the large-scale, cross-
national and temporal context that we need here, but due to the associ-
ation with educational requirements (see above) indicators of the latter
(see further below) can be used as proxies.
According to our theoretical outline, it is important to estimate the sep-
arate employment effects of skill upgrading and mismatch in a joint
model. Duncan and Hoffman (1981) decompose attained education (in
years) into three parts: (a) education required in the worker’s current
job, (b) education attained by the worker that exceeds current job require-
ments, and (c) education required by the current job that exceeds what the
worker has attained. This model (known as ORU: Over-Required-Under)
thus allows estimation of separate payoffs to education dependent on the
nature of the job match.
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We apply the ORU model to aggregate data on occupation and edu-
cation at the country-by-year level. Skill demand is indicated by ISCO
(International Standard Classification of Occupations) categories of the
jobs held by individual workers. Similarly, on the basis of individual edu-
cation (ISCED categories; International Standard Classification of Edu-
cation), a measure of skill supply is constructed. Three skill levels of
both education and occupation are distinguished: high, medium and
low (for level definitions, see below and Table 1).
ISCO
allows all jobs in the world to be classified into 436 unit groups… aggregated
into 130 minor groups, 43 sub-major groups and 10 major groups, based on
their similarity in terms of the skill level and skill specialization required for
the jobs. (ILO 2012: 1)
Here, we use the major groups (indicated by ISCO’s first digit, excluding
military occupations) and collapse these into three levels of skill require-
ments: high-skill jobs (ISCO major group 1 =managers and 2 = pro-
fessionals), mid-skill jobs (ISCO major group 3 = associate professionals,
4 = clerical workers and 7 = craft workers) and low-skill jobs (ISCO
major group 5 = sales and service workers, 6 = agricultural workers, 8 =
factory workers and 9 = workers in elementary occupations).
Data from two international surveys, the European Social Survey (ESS)
and the Programme for International Assessment of Adult Competences
(PIAAC; see also endnote 1), provide strong validation of the link
between major occupational groups in ISCO and job-level skill require-
ments. Both ESS (wave 2 in 2004 and wave 5 in 2010) and PIAAC
(data collected in 2008–2016) ask explicitly about job-level educational











Low-skill jobs held by
Low-skill workers (LL)
(.08)
Low-skill jobs held by
Mid-skill workers (ML)
(.19)





Mid-skill jobs held by
Low-skill workers
(LM) (.04)
Mid-skill jobs held by
Mid-skill workers
(MM) (.24)





High-skill jobs held by
Low-skill workers (LH)
(.01)
High-skill jobs held by
Mid-skill workers
(MH) (.06)
High-skill jobs held by
High-skill workers
(HH) (.23)
Note: numbers indicate the average proportions across the 177 country-years.
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requirements, with self-reports by individual workers. The correlation
between the survey respondents’ occupation (ISCO first digit categories,
grouped into three levels of skill requirements as just described) and the
educational requirements (years beyond compulsory school) in their job
amounts to R = 0.50 in ESS and R = 0.56 in PIAAC (for our selection of
countries). On average, the requirements among workers in our ISCO-
based high-skill job category are 5.2 years in ESS and 5.3 years in
PIAAC; in our mid-skill job category 2.7 years in ESS and 2.5 years in
PIAAC; and in our low-skill job category 1.2 years in ESS and 0.6 years
in PIAAC.
ISCED ‘classifies educational programmes into seven broad ordinal
levels (0 to 6), which… reflect the degree of complexity of the content
of an educational programme… from very elementary to more complex
learning experiences’ (Schneider and Kogan 2008 : 17). The seven levels
are the following: 0 = pre-primary education, 1 = primary, 2 = lower sec-
ondary, 3 = upper secondary, 4 = post-secondary non-tertiary, 5 = first
stage tertiary, and 6 = second stage tertiary education. A common group-
ing of these seven levels is to distinguish three major educational stages: 0–
2, 3–4 and 5–6, reflecting primary, secondary and tertiary schooling,
respectively. We follow this convention here.
Although the three stages clearly correspond to different amounts of
schooling as indicated by years of education, there is no generally
agreed upon conversion rate between stages and years, not least
because such rates tend to differ both across time and between
countries. Still, good indications are available as proxies. For example,
according to average expert ratings used in the PIAAC survey for the
group of countries we examine, primary education (ISCED 0–2) is on
average 8.0 years long, while secondary education (ISCED 3–4) adds
an average of 3.9 years and tertiary education (ISCED 5–6) adds a
further 3.4 years on average. A typical person with a completed second-
ary education would thus have around 12 years of schooling while
someone with an average tertiary degree would have about 15 years
of education.
The match between skill supply and demand is measured by cross-
classifying educational (ISCED) and occupational (ISCO) levels; all
observed worker-job matches (individuals with jobs) are sorted into
this 9-cell (3 by 3) matrix. For each country-year, the nine proportions
sum to unity.
The proportions in Table 1 are computed from data on women and
men (combined), age 30–39. We select this age group for computing
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the independent variables in order to limit endogeneity issues, i.e. confla-
tion of determinants and outcomes in the regression models (based on
data for youth and mid-aged). Three match measures are constructed
on the basis of the proportions in each education-occupation (ISCED
by ISCO) cell, as follows.
Matched education = LL∗0+MM∗0.5+HH∗1
Overeducation = ML∗0.5+HM∗0.5+HL∗1
Undereducation = LM∗0.5+MH∗0.5+ LH∗1
Note that LL = 0 in the scale of matched education does not imply
that the LL category (low-educated workers in low-skill jobs) is
weighted zero, only that it indicates the lowest combined (education/
occupation) skill level. The sum of shares of the nine education-by-
occupation categories is always unity; the size of any single category
(including LL) is always 1 minus the sum of shares of the other
eight categories.
Setting the mid-level skill values (between 0 for low and 1 for high) to
exactly 0.5 is essentially arbitrary. As indicated above, it is possible to
replace these values with empirically grounded numbers by using infor-
mation from international surveys (ESS and PIAAC) with explicit inter-
view questions on educational requirements in the respondents’ jobs
and ratings of years of schooling completed at the different stages of
education.
According to ESS (see above) the average number of years of edu-
cation required in jobs at the three skill levels is 5.2, 2.7 and 1.2, respect-
ively. On a scale running from 0 to 1, with low-skill jobs at 0 and high-
skill jobs at 1, the ESS estimates imply a mid-level value of 0.375 ((2.7–
1.2)/(5.2–1.2) = 1.5/4 = 0.375). The corresponding value based on PIAAC
data (see above) is 0.426 ((2.6–0.6)/(5.3–0.6) = 2/4.7 = 0.426). For edu-
cation, the conversion rate in PIAAC (see above) between stages and
years of education is primary = 8 years, secondary = 11.9 years and ter-
tiary 15.3 years. On a scale running from 0 to 1, with low education
(primary) at 0 and high education (tertiary) at 1, the PIAAC estimates
imply a mid-level (secondary education) value of 0.534 ((11.9–8)/
(15.3–8) = 3.9/7.3 = 0.534).
Using these empirically grounded values for the mid-level categories of
occupation (based on the mean of estimates from ESS and PIAAC) and
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education (from PIAAC) yields the following alternatively scaled ORU
(skill match) variables:3
Matched education = LL∗0+MM∗0.47+HH∗1
Overeducation = ML∗0.47+HM∗0.53+HL∗1
Undereducation = LM∗0.46+MH∗0.54+ LH∗1
Replacing the simplified values of 0–0.5–1 with the more empirically
grounded values just shown, based on data from ESS and PIAAC as
described above, does not substantially influence the parameter estimates
of main interest, however (regression results are available upon request).
The empirical analyses we use in the paper are therefore based on the
more simple 0–0.5–1 values.
The measures are then inserted into the following regression equation,
where i indicates country and t indicates year. A set of dummy variables
(taking the value one if true and zero otherwise) have been computed for
each country and each year (minus one of each which are the reference
categories); the parameters tied to these dummies hence constitute fixed
effects (FE) for countries and years.
Youth employmentti = a+ b1∗Matched educationti









Figure 3 displays the structural change of skill from 1998 to 2015 for the
ten examined countries, as indicated by the three ORU components. For
most of the countries, and as summarized by the average chart, a consider-
able amount of skill upgrading has taken place during the period. On top
of a joint growth of skill supply and demand, as indicated by the measure
of matched education, the rate of overeducation (excess supply of school-
ing) has also risen substantially in most countries. Conversely, underedu-
cation has tended to decline.
The analytic task facing us now is to assess the extent to which youth
employment decline (see Figure 1) and the structural growth of skill
(see Figure 3) are empirically interconnected.
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Empirical results
In presenting empirical results, we begin by providing estimates based on
the ORU model above, where we expect matched skill upgrading and
rising skill mismatch (especially overeducation) to negatively affect
youth employment. We also briefly evaluate alternative explanations
that have been suggested in accounting for youth employment decline,
as outlined above.
In Tables 2(a,b), parameter estimates from the ORU model are shown,
for men and women respectively, indicating the separate effects of
matched skill upgrading, overeducation and undereducation on youth
employment. In model 1, youth employment is predicted by the ORU
components only, without country-year fixed effects and regardless of
the mid-age employment rate. As hypothesized, both matched upgrading
and overeducation are negatively associated with youth employment. This
applies to both males and females but the effects are weaker for women.
Figure 3. Matched education, overeducation and undereducation in the labor market.
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Undereducation has no significant effect. The combined impact of the
three ORU parameters is highly significant (see the Chi-square values).
When model 1 is estimated with OLS (results not shown but available
upon request), more than half of the variation in male youth employment
is accounted for by the ORU parameters (R2 = 0.55), and one fourth of the
corresponding variation for women (R2 = 0.26).
As discussed earlier, omitted variable bias may occur due to unobserved
influence of stable differences across countries and time-bound country-
common influences. In model 2, these differences are controlled for by
using fixed effects for countries and years. The ORU parameter estimates,
especially for women, are stronger in this model specification than in the
previous one, suggesting that stable differences between countries and
Table 2a. Regression of male youth employment on required education, overeducation
and undereducation.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
b t b t b t b t
Constant 1.02 17.81 1.06 14.15 0.03 0.33 0.11 1.11
Matched educ. −0.33 −2.81 −0.45 −3.51 −0.46 −5.77 −0.58 −6.75
Overeduc. −0.54 −4.53 −0.67 −3.11 −0.70 −5.43 −0.78 −6.02
Undereduc. 0.17 0.86 0.00 0.00 −0.59 −3.33 −0.64 −3.52
Mid-age male employment – – – – 1.22 14.64 1.18 12.64
Country/year
fixed effects
No Yes Yes Yes









Notes: N = 177 (country-years); ORU CHI2 =Wald test of the combined effect of Overeducation, Matched
education and Undereducation (ORU).
Table 2b. Regression of female youth employment on required education,
overeducation and undereducation.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
b t b t b t b t
Constant 0.88 10.62 1.16 11.42 0.76 5.03 0.94 5.84
Matched educ. −0.23 −1.91 −0.71 −4.78 −0.74 −5.59 −0.99 −6.30
Overeduc. −0.35 −1.99 −0.99 −3.63 −0.98 −3.96 −1.20 −4.60
Undereduc. −0.05 −0.18 −0.80 −2.32 −1.09 −3.03 −1.53 −3.99
Mid-age male employment – – – – 0.47 3.65 0.43 3.28
Country/year
fixed effects
No Yes Yes Yes









Notes: N = 177 (country-years); ORU CHI2 =Wald test of the combined effect of Overeducation, Matched
education and Undereducation (ORU).
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country-common change bias the association between skill structure and
youth employment downwards.
In model 3, mid-age male employment is entered as a covariate, for
both males and females. This model hence predicts the gap between
youth and mid-age employment. The ORU coefficients differ very little
between models 2 and 3 for both men and women (with the exception
of undereducation for men). This indicates that upgrading of the skill
structure increases the youth employment gap primarily by worsening
youth employment prospects, not by improving (or otherwise changing)
mid-age employment chances. The undereducation parameter is also sig-
nificantly negative for both men and women in this model.
In model 4, education is held constant between youth and mid-age
individuals. This results in slightly stronger associations between
changes in the skill structure and youth employment chances, among
both women and men. The education advantage of the young relative to
the mid-aged apparently contributes to some (but quite limited) closure
of the youth employment gap (the remaining part being tied to a deficit
in experience), since the gap grows when education is held constant.
Visualizing the empirical association between skill structure and
youth employment
In Figure 4(a,b) youth employment rates as predicted by the ORU par-
ameter estimates are shown over observed proportions of the nine edu-
cation-occupation cells (LL, MM, HH etc.) in the skill match matrix.
The visualization is performed in order to facilitate the interpretation of
the results and link the coefficient estimates to observed variation in the
proportions underlying the ORUmodel (cf. Table 1). This means that pre-
dicted values are computed for observed combinations of values in all the
three ORU variables. Variation in cells linked to a specific ORU-variable
can hence not be interpreted as controlled for the other two ORU-vari-
ables in this visualization (in contrast to the regression), only for fixed
effects (countries and years) and general labor demand (mid-age employ-
ment). We use estimates frommodel 3 rather than 4 in order to capture all
implications of educational expansion for youth employment, including
the (limited) positive effects from the youth advantage in educational
attainment. Predicted employment rates are indicated on the vertical
axes and observed education-occupation shares on the horizontal axes;
the dots in the figures indicate the location of the 177 country-year
units in this space.
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With regard to matched skill upgrading, the figures imply that an
observed growth in HH jobs (high education, high occupation) markedly
widens the youth employment gap while an observed growth in LL (low
education, low occupation) and MM (mid-level education, mid-level
occupation) jobs closes the gap. This pattern accords well with our theor-
etical expectations, supporting the hypothesis that skill upgrading is linked
to youth employment decline. The associations involved are strong. For
example, a one percentage point decrease in LL jobs is associated with
about one percentage point larger youth employment gaps (slightly
weaker for males and slightly stronger for females).
With regard to skill mismatch, growth inHL andHM jobs (both indicat-
ing overeducation) widens the youth employment gap, in line with the
crowding-out hypothesis. An observed increase in undereducation (LH,
MH, LM) is positively associated with youth employment in these figures
Figure 4a. Predicted changes in male youth employment over changes in ed./occ. com-
binations.
Note: Predicted values are from model 3 and are computed for observed combinations of values in all the
three ORU variables. Variation in cells linked to a specific ORU-variable can hence not be interpreted as
controlled for the other two ORU-variables in this visualization (in contrast to the regression), only for
fixed effects (countries and years) and general labor demand (mid-age employment).
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in contrast to the negative coefficient estimates in Table 2. The reversion is
possible because the negative effect in Table 2 is solely driven by variation
within undereducation cells (e.g. shifts from LM to LH). That negative
effect is in line with what we suggest in our theoretical outline, i.e. that
undereducation represents mismatched skill upgrading driven by the
demand side (see endnote 2), equally negative for youth employment as
matched and supply driven upgrading, although less consequential (since
undereducation is both relatively rare and in decline). In Figure 4, on the
other hand, effects of undereducation may also be driven by changes in
undereducation that affect the other ORU variables (e.g. shifts from ML
toMH). On average, this effect seems to be positive for youth employment,
plausibly because it decreases crowding in low-skill jobs.
Assessment of alternative explanations
Finally, we briefly assess alternative explanations of youth employment
decline. We have estimated models including the following time-varying
Figure 4b. Predicted changes in female youth employment over changes in ed./occ.
combinations. Note: see note to figure 4a.
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control variables: GDP and hours worked per capita in the working age
population (as indicators of general labor demand), employment protec-
tion legislation (regular and temporary), ALMP expenses and the immi-
grant share of employment.
GDP size and ALMP expenses are all positively and significantly associ-
ated with youth employment, net of the ORU parameters. The same is true
for the immigrant share of employment, thus indicating that youth and
immigrant employment tend to grow together rather than trade off. In
contrast, average hours worked in the working age population and
employment protection legislation have no significant relationship with
youth employment. However, none of the control variables has a substan-
tively large impact, and – crucially – none of them affects our focal esti-
mates (the ORU parameters) more than marginally. Therefore we do
not present the results of these analyses in detailed (table) form (but
they are available in the article’s online appendix).
Figure 5. Relative evolution of educational requirements in the labor market 1998–2015
(1998 = 100).
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The issue of job polarization is not as easily assessed, since the struc-
tural change of skill is already included as part of our main independent
variables (i.e. the ORU-parameters). We can however assess how well a
polarization scenario, in contrast to our main story, fits our analysis.
First of all, consider Figure 5, showing the relative evolution of educational
requirements of jobs as indicated by our three ISCO-categories. It is
evident that polarization does not seem to occur over the observed
time-period in the examined countries. Low-skill and mid-skill occu-
pations appear to decline at a similar rate, while the share of high-skill
occupations steadily increases throughout the whole period. We interpret
this pattern as clearly indicating structural upgrading, not polarization.
Furthermore, in Figure 4, it is quite evident that youth employment
varies with flows downward of highly educated individuals to low-skill
jobs, not flows downward of mid-educated individuals to low-skill jobs.
We hence conclude that both the descriptive data and the regression
models fit our story much better than the polarization scenario.
Concluding discussion
Labor market prospects for youth have deteriorated significantly in many
OECD countries over recent decades. This development has so far not
been adequately explained. In the spirit of Ryan (2001), and consistent
with standard human capital theory, we have proposed an explanatory
account based on skill upgrading as a main cause of youth employment
decline, and augmented this account with crowding-out mechanisms
tied to skill mismatch, normally not considered in the human capital fra-
mework. Using data on ten northwestern European countries over the
period 1998–2015, we have estimated associations between the structural
change of skill and youth employment decline. The main conclusion is
that both matched skill upgrading and overeducation are strongly and
negatively linked to young people’s employment chances. In concluding,
we point to some issues that need further discussion and analysis.
First, it is important to note that youth is (obviously) not a homo-
geneous category. On the contrary: there is a very large variation among
young people (as in other age groups) in resources of different kinds,
related to family background, ethnicity, education, health, etc. Many
young people today certainly have good long-term opportunities, maybe
better than those of previous generations. While a majority of youth
might do fine, delayed entry to – or long-term exclusion from – the
labor market probably has strongly negative consequences for the least
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resourceful youth categories. Hence, inequality among young people is
likely to increase as a consequence of deteriorating employment chances
for youth, with potential repurcussions across the life-course. Therefore,
widening youth employment gaps both reflect and increase more
general inequality.
Second, joint analyses of employment and wages are needed. Since
shifts in supply and demand affect both quantities and prices, or employ-
ment and wages in this case, an analysis of the change in relative strength
of different groups in the labor market should ideally consider both out-
comes. As noted above, different countries display different relative mag-
nitudes of employment and wage changes as consequences of supply-
demand shifts, depending on the character of labor market institutions.
It is therefore important to take wages into account when assessing the
evolution of employment gaps between population categories. An innova-
tive and useful approach can be found in Christopoulou (2013) who esti-
mates a system of simultaneous equations, with employment and wages as
co-determined and correlated outcomes. Integrating such an approach
with the structural supply-demand model used in the present paper
would be a productive way forward and a useful complement to the ana-
lyses reported above.
Third, what are the policy implications of our findings? Our main con-
clusion is that skill upgrading and skill mismatch are associated with youth
employment decline. But skill upgrading is of course beneficial in many
ways. Perhaps the most important lesson to be learned from our analysis
is that employment difficulties for youth, at least relative to other age
groups but probably also in absolute terms, are strongly linked to economic
and technological advancement. In that sense, youth employment decline
can be seen as a negative side-effect of a positive general development. A
possible avenue forward would be to raise the general employment rate
by subsidizing low-skill entry-level jobs in sectors where labor demand is
high but wage floors are (prohibitively) high as well. While stimulating
expansion of low-skill jobs reduces average productivity of the workforce,
it might, by lifting the employment rate, raise average productivity of the
population. This dynamic could be further improved by expanding oppor-
tunities for upward job mobility from the entry level, something easier said
than done. Regardless of specific policy proposals, however, it is of course
important to understand the general causes of secular change in youth
labor markets in order to evaluate more long-run options.
With regard to skill mismatch it is easier to see how policies might be
usefully redesigned. Our results indicate that educational expansion can
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go too far, or at least go in a less than optimal direction. Here we seem to
confront a problem of the ‘tragedy of the commons’ type: at the individual
level, it is typically rational to pursue further education in order to become
more competitive in the jobmarket. And this is also the standard policy rec-
ommendation. But the more individuals in general increase their edu-
cation, the tougher the competition will get for each person. According
to our results, aggregate overeducation may hurt young people’s employ-
ment opportunities considerably. The paramount policy task under such
circumstances is therefore hardly to expand education in general but in a
more prudent manner regarding both magnitude and direction.
Finally, the theoretical outline and empirical analyses of the present
paper need much further elaboration. We have suggested a model of
the underlying causes of youth employment decline – a widespread
and important contemporary social problem that has so far eluded
explanation – and found it to be a plausible account of the observed
empirical patterns. In contrast, as far as we can determine, alternative
explanations suggested in the literature appear empirically less well
founded, or at least our main conclusions are unaffected by taking the
alternatives into account. Still, our theory and findings at this stage
are both limited and preliminary. We anticipate future advances along
these and other lines in the years ahead.
Notes
1. Assumption (a): Experience is clearly more valued for the hiring of higher
white-collar than blue-collar workers: mean difference = .27, p < .001; Assump-
tion (b): Experience is clearly more valued than education for the hiring of blue-
collar workers: mean difference = .26, p < .001. In principle, we can also use
supply side (worker reported) data in order to test the assumptions, such as
The Programme for the International Assessment of Adult Competencies
(PIAAC; data collected 2008–2016 in 30 OECD countries; N=24,891 for the
selection of countries we also analyze in this study). Both self-reported experi-
ence and education demands are recorded in this survey but they are measured
on different scales, so without additional strong assumptions, we can only test
assumption A. Experience demands were measured on an ordinal scale which
we recoded into the following values: None = 0, Less than 1 month = 0.05, 1–6
months = 0.25, 7–11 months = 0.75, 1 or 2 years = 1.5, and 3 years or more =
4. The consequent mean difference between low-skill and high-skill work (as
defined in our paper, see methods section) provides further clear support for
assumption A (mean difference = 1.33, p < .001).
2. Note that as long as skill grows both on the supply and demand side, or at least
grows on one side without declining on the other, both kinds of mismatch –
overeducation and undereducation – imply upgrading of the overall skill
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structure, and can therefore negatively affect employment chances of youth. Of
the two mismatch types, a focus on overeducation is motivated because it affects
many more individuals: as will become evident below (see table 1 and figure 3)
it is widespread as a share of the workforce and shows an increasing rate over
time while the rate of undereducation is relatively low and falling.
3. The mean of ESS and PIAAC for mid-level occupations is 0.401 while the
PIAAC estimate for mid-level education is 0.534. For matched education
with LL=0 and HH=1 as givens, these values imply MM=0.467 estimated as
the average of 0.401 and 0.534. For overeducation, ML is 0.534 (for mid-level
education) minus 0 (low-level occupation) equals 0.534, while HM is 1 (for
high-level education) minus 0.401 (for mid-level occupation) equals 0.599.
Since HL is the sum of ML and HM and is set to 1, the values of ML and
and HM need to be multiplied by 1 divided by the sum of ML and HM, thus
ML=0.534*(1/(0.534+0.599))=0.471 and HM=0.599*(1/(0.534+0.599))=0.529.
For undereducation, LM is 0.401 (for mid-level occupation) minus 0 (for
low-level education) equals 0.401, while MH is 1 (for high-level occupation)
minus 0.534 (for mid-level education) equals 0.466. Since LH is the sum of
LM and MH and is set to 1, the values of LM and and MH need to be multiplied
by 1 divided by the sum of LM and MH, thus LM=0.401*(1/(0.401
+0.466))=0.462 and MH=0.466*(1/(0.401+0.466))=0.538.
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